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2ABSTRACT 
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This article discusses the admissibility of repressed memory evidence in sexual abuse 
cases.  It postures that current treatment of such evidence exemplifies the continued lack of 
understanding society has of how harshly sexual abuse impacts victims.  Analysis focuses on 
whether discovery rules should toll statutes of limitations, whether or not “discovery” has 
occurred, whether or not courts should admit repressed memory evidence, and, if so, the 
applicable standard of proof needed to prove the abuse.   
These issues require careful scrutiny of a variety of competing concerns.  Proponents of 
the use of repressed memory evidence focus on the need for victims to have their day in court, 
and the difficulty victims have proving sexual abuse.  Opponents, on the other hand, focus on 
defendants’ right of repose and the unreliability of repressed memory evidence.  After comparing 
these various concerns, the article concludes that state legislatures should create statutory 
schemes that better balance competing concerns and that better predict the treatment of repressed 
memory evidence in court.   
In addition to these concerns, much of the repressed memory debate centers on whether 
the victim recovered the memory spontaneously or via a therapeutic trigger method.  With this in 
mind, the article suggests that statutory schemes could better balance the competing concerns by 
treating spontaneously recovered memories with more leniency than therapeutically recovered 
memories.   
To delineate this argument, the article compares the current New York statutory scheme 
to the current California statutory scheme.  It contends that California’s scheme provides a solid 
starting point and model for other states to follow and expand upon, while challenging New 
York’s scheme as far too imbalanced against victims.   
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4I. INTRODUCTION
Sexual abuse is by no means a new crime afflicting society, and it has certainly received 
increased attention in recent decades.1 In spite of such increased attention, society remains 
backward-minded, failing to grasp the severity of psychological trauma sexual abuse victims 
endure.  Treatment of various types of evidence during the litigation of sexual abuse cases, such 
as repressed memory evidence, illustrates this lack-luster attitude.  Repression of memory occurs 
when ideas, perceptions, and memories of past trauma are forced into the unconscious. 2 
Memory recovery can then occur spontaneously or with the help of various therapeutic 
techniques.  Despite that recovered memory evidence allows victims otherwise barred by statutes 
of limitations to bring claims of sexual abuse, such evidence still receives a great deal of 
criticism.  
Victims face three main hurdles when they bring sexual abuse lawsuits.  First, they must 
get past the applicable statute of limitations, which requires a determination of not only whether 
a discovery rule will apply to toll the statute of limitations, but also what constitutes “discovery.”  
Second, victims must obtain a favorable ruling on the admissibility of recovered memory 
evidence.   And finally, once admitted into court, victims must adequately prove the abuse 
according to the applicable standard of proof. 
State legislatures could do a great deal more to ensure that victims navigate these hurdles 
with greater ease.  Current approaches to application of discovery rules, rulings on admissibility, 
 
1 FERGUSSON, DAVID M. & MULLEN, PAUL E., CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE – AN EVIDENCE BASED PERSPECTIVE 1 
(Sage Publications, Inc. 1999). 
2 Johnson, Laura, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law: Evidence Litigating Nightmares: Repressed Memories of 
Childhood Sexual Abuse, 51 S.C. L. REV. 939, 942 (Summer 2000). 
5and application of standards of proof do not create enough predictability or consistency.  While 
recovered memories do inherently contain an element of unreliability, legislatures should avoid a 
wholesale prohibition of recovered memory evidence.  Statutes should exist to allow application 
of delayed discovery doctrines to all cases involving recovered memories.  However, to help 
balance the aforementioned concerns, legislatures should then distinguish between 
therapeutically and spontaneously recovered memories, when delineating what exactly triggers 
“discovery.”  That is, instances of spontaneous recovery should not trigger “discovery” as easily 
as instances of therapeutic recovery would.  Beyond making a determination as to whether or not 
“discovery” has been triggered, judges should not hold any further gate-keeping power.  Instead 
statutes should allow all recovered memory evidence into the courtroom for the jury to evaluate.  
Once inside the courtroom, legislatures should again distinguish between spontaneously and 
therapeutically recovered memories when delineating applicable standards of proof.  Statutes 
should hold victims who recovered memory of abuse spontaneously to a lower standard of proof 
than victims who recovered memory of abuse via therapeutic techniques. 
II. HISTORY OF SEXUAL ABUSE
History shows the continual discovery and rediscovery of sexual abuse; however, only in 
recent decades has society begun to recognize and publicly expose cases of sexual abuse.  Dr. 
Roland Summit’s statement from 1988 portrays a more traditional outlook of sexual abuse: 
“There is a sad, self-preserving irony about a world that cannot see its own cruelty with victims 
who can’t give voice to their pain.  After 125 years of discarded enlightenment, we still act as if 
victims are freaks and as if it is a virtue to be ignorant of sexual victimization.” 3 People may 
 
3 CONTE, JON R., CRITICAL ISSUES IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE – HISTORICAL, LEGAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 99 (Sage Publications, Inc., 2002). 
6have always accepted the possibility that sexual abuse can occur, but it remains debatable that 
people accept the reality that it actually does occur; especially the prevalence with which it 
occurs.  Let us say that a person’s friend or family member is a victim of sexual abuse.  Would 
this change his look-the-other-way mentality towards the crime?  This question remains 
debatable today just as it did prior to three decades ago.  In fact, during the first seven decades of 
the 20th century, little was written about sexual abuse.  Scholars did not consider rape and sexual 
abuse topics worth writing about.4 When writings produced, they were filled with skepticism 
and fear, and downplayed the seriousness of the issue.5 Before 1975, articles pertaining to rape 
and sexual abuse focused largely on the fear of fabricated allegations.6 Even as far back as Sir 
Matthew Hale, who served as Chief Justice of the Court of King’s Bench in England for several 
years a couple centuries ago, and who did not appear to have undue skepticism of women 
alleging rape wrote, “It must be remembered, that rape is an accusation easily to be made and 
hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, though never so innocent.”7
For generations afterward, law review authors and judges continued to quote this statement by 
Hale during discussions of sexual offenses.  It is understandable that skepticism of sexual 
offenses should exist.  However, the level of skepticism seen prior to 1975 went far beyond 
moderation.8
4 Id, at 34. 
5 Id, at 30 and 33. 
6 Id, at 35-37. 
7 Id, at 35, as written in Hale’s treatise, The History of the Pleas of the Crown, published in 1736.   
8 Id, at 41. 
7Due to the lack of documentation on sexual abuse before 1975, little is known about the 
prosecution of such cases prior to this time.9 One study done at the beginning of the 21st century 
by John E. B. Myers, Susan E. Diedrich, Devon Lee, Kelly Fincher, and Rachel M. Stern 
examined 463 appellate opinions of sexual abuse cases between 1900 and 1950.  This study 
shows a steady but modest increase in the volume of sexual abuse prosecution between 1900 and 
1950, with very few occurring between 1900 and 1910.10 These appellate decisions from 1900 
to 1950 show less skepticism toward victims of sexual abuse than expected,11 however, the study 
only examines appellate opinions.  Thus, the study does not make clear whether or not the trial 
courts showed the same lack of skepticism.12 
After 1975, the country witnessed the birth of the women’s rights movement and the 
victims’ rights movement, an increase in science, and a more modern idea of child protection.  
As a result, much more documentation of the subject exists from the past few decades.13 In 
addition, the prevalence of sexual abuse cases increased significantly during the 1980’s and 
1990’s.14 However, the increase in written material and the resulting increase in awareness have 
not necessarily reduced the skepticism that has historically pervaded this area.15 For example, in 
2002 prosecutors in Oregon dropped their case against a victim’s father when she spoke up about 
other sexual abuse by her neighbor.  They felt that her accusations against the neighbor created 
 
9 Id, at 42. 
10 Id, at 47 and 53. 
11 Id, at 53. 
12 Id, at 55-56. 
13 Id, at 42. 
14 Id, at 63. 
15 Id, at 42. 
8“evidence of past sexual behavior” that her father’s attorney would be able to use against her.16 
In another Oregon case, school officials waited three to four years after hearing several underage 
girls complain of sexual abuse by their music instructor before calling the police in 1999.17 Also, 
in 1999 Sports Illustrated did a special report on sexual abuse in youth sports.18 This article 
focused particularly on a Little League coach from San Bernardino, California who received an 
84 year prison sentence after pleading guilty to sexually abusing five children under his 
instruction between 1990 and 1996.19 Prior to this case he received a sentence of up to seven 
years at a state mental hospital for molesting other children.20 He estimates that he molested 
several hundred children over 30 years.21 When parents of the San Bernardino Little League 
found out about his past of sexual abuse, they tried to inform Little League officials.  
Unfortunately, the perpetrator convinced them that he had changed his ways and that they had 
nothing to worry about.22 These examples clearly demonstrate the continued skepticism and 
ignorance of today, as summarized in the 1999 Sports Illustrated article: “Societal ignorance 
about the nature of pedophilia is another thing that keeps victims from coming forward…society 
doesn’t understand what happened to them, doesn’t understand the seduction process.”23 
16 A Child’s Calls Unanswered, THE OREGONIAN, Sept. 9, 2002.   
17 Danks, Holly, Music Teacher Sentenced for Sex Abuse of Students, THE OREGONIAN, Feb. 16, 2001, at D5.  
18 Nack, William, and Yaeger, Don, Who’s Coaching Your Kid?  The Frightening Truth About Child Molestation in 
Youth Sports, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 13, 1999, at 40-53. 
19 Id, at 42. 
20 Id, at 50. 
21 Id, at 42. 
22 Id, at 53. 
23 Id, at 50. 
9As sexual abuse prosecution and litigation has increased during the past few decades, so 
too has professional and scientific involvement.24 Increased involvement by professionals has 
led many to start questioning the truth of sexual abuse allegations, suggesting that many 
allegations have a basis in weak or flawed evidence.  For example, in 1987, E.P. Benedeck and 
D.H. Schetky wrote: 
Child psychiatrists, pediatricians and mental health professionals have recently been 
concerned by a deluge of referrals requesting evaluation of young children in regard to 
allegations of sexual abuse.  A new cottage industry/profession has evolved and a group 
of experts in this specialist area have emerged to fill a serious need.  Many of these 
experts, although well meaning, seem to be self-proclaimed and biased, always finding 
sexual abuse where alleged.25 
With the increased involvement of professionals came an increased involvement by the 
scientific community. As the general public became more aware of the prevalence of sexual 
abuse, research in the field has increased26 such that the “general scientific research 
community”27 no longer has the same degree of skepticism regarding sexual abuse allegations.   
Over time researchers have concluded that sexual abuse is by no means uncommon, that children 
of certain social status and from certain family situations have a greater risk of sexual abuse, and 
that exposure to sexual abuse can be linked to mental health issues and other problems later in 
life.  These conclusions have led to even further awareness by the public of sexual abuse.28 
24 Fergusson, at 5. 
25 Fergusson, at 5-6. 
26 Id.
27 Fergusson, at 6. 
28 Fergusson, at 7. 
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Along with the increased scientific involvement, courts began seeing the introduction of 
expert testimony in sexual abuse cases.29 This phenomenon also came about as part of the post 
1980 reform era.30 Of the 463 cases evaluated in the study done by Myers, et al., none between 
1900 and 1950 involved use of experts by the prosecutors.31 The idea of using experts from the 
mental health profession stemmed from the lack of evidence that generally existed in sexual 
abuse cases.32 Even today, significant debate centers on the appropriateness of these experts 
because some issues relating to sexual abuse are not yet beyond doubt and question.33 
III. DEVELOPMENT OF REPRESSED MEMORY SYNDROME
a. Introduction
As previously mentioned, repression of memory occurs when a person forces memories 
associated with trauma from their conscious to their unconscious.34 Victims do not forget these 
memories, rather they stow the memories away elsewhere for later discovery.  Unlike 
suppression of memory, where victims remain aware of the traumatic memory but choose to 
avoid it by shoving it aside in their mind, repression of memory occurs when the memory is 
actually “inaccessible to the conscious mind.”  Repression of memory does not destroy the 
 
29 Clark, Karla-Dee, Innocent Victims and Blind Justice: Childrens’ Rights to be Free From Childhood Sexual 
Abuse, Spring 1990 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 214, 248.  Clark comments that “The use of expert testimony in child 
sexual abuse cases is just beginning to take form.” 
30 Conte, at 56. 
31 Id, at 55. 
32 Id, at 59. 
33 Fergusson, at 7. 
34 Johnson, at 942. 
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memory, rather, the memory later requires stimuli to re-appear in the conscious mind.35 As it 
can often take quite a while for these memories to re-surface in the conscious mind, the theory of 
repressed memory relies on the idea that victims have not always had awareness of the injury.36 
Most psychologists buy into the theory that the human mind can actually repress 
memories.37 In 1896 Sigmund Freud first proposed the idea that memories do actually last a 
long time but that the human mind will bury certain traumatic memories as a defense 
mechanism.  He extended this theory to suggest that in particular the human mind can repress 
memories that cause anxiety, such as childhood abuse.  Most therapists and psychoanalysts 
accept Freud’s idea about repressed memories;38 an idea he describes as slowly excavating a 
“buried city…layer by layer.”39 
b. The Repressed Memory Debate
The debate about repressed memory evidence stems less from a lack of belief that people 
can actually repress memories and instead from whether these repressed memories, once 
recovered, have enough reliability.40 Evaluation of repressed evidence has to balance the need to 
protect victims of abuse with the need to protect individuals from false accusations.41 Opponents 
 
35 Spadaro, Joseph A., Note, An Elusive Search for the Truth: The Admissibility of Repressed and Recovered 
Memories in Light of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 30 CONN. L. REV. 1147, 1157 (Spring 1998). 
36 Id.
37 Id, at 1154. 
38 Id, at 1186. 
39 Johnson, at 943. 
40 Smith, Colette Mulrenan, Comment, Recovered Memories of Alleged Sexual Abuse: An Analysis of The Theory of 
Repressed Memories Under the Washington Rules of Evidence, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 51, 60 (Fall 1994). 
41 Spadaro, at 1167. 
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worry about reliability of recovered memories because the idea of repression has basis only in 
unsubstantiated speculation and anecdotal evidence.  Proponents, on the other hand, feel that 
recovered memories do have scientific validity and accuracy, and that regardless, many mental 
health theories are difficult to prove with empirical evidence.  In particular, these proponents 
argue that gathering empirical evidence of repressed memory would be nearly impossible, 
practically and ethically, because it would require exposing victims to extreme trauma. 42 
Specifically, opponents find issue with the various trigger methods for recovering 
repressed memories.  Some triggering mechanisms cause spontaneous resurfacing, while other 
mechanisms draw out the memories over time.  Spontaneous triggers include flashbacks, fleeting 
glances, surprise memories, or other stimuli.  Opponents of repressed memory evidence have less 
of an issue with recovery of memories via one of these spontaneous triggering methods because 
the likelihood of memory implantation dramatically decreases in such instances.  These 
opponents become less happy with spontaneously recovered memories when people 
subsequently seek therapy to help “draw out the repressed memories more fully.”43 
Therapy induced memory recovery causes even more speculation and dispute.44 The most 
common devices used in therapy to draw out repressed memories include guided imagery and 
hypnosis.45 Hypnosis involves artificially inducing a state of sleep or trance.  Guided imagery, a 
 
42 Id, at 1158. 
43 Fletcher, Camille L., Note, Repressed Memories: Do Triggering Methods Contribute to Witness Testimony 
Reliability? 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 335, 348 (2003). 
44 Johnson, at 947. 
45 Richmond, Douglas R., Bad Science: Repressed and Recovered Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 44 KAN. L. 
REV. 517, 523 (May 1996). 
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form of hypnosis, involves starting with known facts and then guiding a person towards a 
purported factual base. 46 Other devices also include group therapy, books, and 
questionnaires.47 Opponents claim issue with such devices because they fear there is too much 
risk of implantation of false memories.48 In addition to concern of false implantation of 
memories, opponents worry about the suggestibility of witnesses and distortion of recovered 
memories by filling in memory gaps with false details.49 Such opponents fear that therapists aim 
to heal patients and in doing so have a tendency of too easily labeling symptoms as results of 
early childhood sexual abuse.50 Moreover, opponents worry that the “absolute belief or 
conviction in the accuracy of the therapeutically induced memory”51 will create ineffective 
cross-examination.52 
The concern over implantation of false memories led individuals who had been wrongly 
accused of sexual abuse to form the False Memory Syndrome Foundation (FMS) in 1992.  
Interestingly, however, even supporters of FMS believe that humans can repress memories but 
argue that many times people falsely claim to have recovered memories of abuse.53 
46 Id, at 523-524. 
47 Johnson, at 946. 
48 Id, at 941. 
49 Eisenberg, Matthew J., Comment, Recovered Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse: The Admissibility Question,
68 TEMPLE L. REV. 249, 261 (Spring 1995).  
50 Johnson, at 947. 
51 Richmond, at 526. 
52 Eisenberg, at 262. 
53 Johnson, at 949. 
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IV. IMPACT OF DISCOVERY RULES AND STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS ON CASES 
INVOLVING REPRESSED MEMORY
a. Statute of Limitations and Discovery Rules
The hot debate over recovered memories centers on a few main issues involved in sexual 
abuse lawsuits.  First, it must be determined whether or not the claim will be barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations.  Due to the basic idea behind repressed memory that victims 
remain unaware of any injuries from sexual abuse until the memory is recovered, the question of 
whether or not this unawareness should prevent the statute of limitations from running must be 
determined.54 
Typically a statute of limitations will begin running at the time the injury occurs, 
regardless of whether the victim is aware of the injury.  Sexual abuse claims differ slightly in that 
statutes of limitation do not run until after the victim turns eighteen.  Frequently in sexual abuse 
claims the victim will not remember the trauma until after the statute of limitation has run, which 
would ordinarily mean that the victim would not have a claim.55 Proponents argue the unfairness 
to victims of this kind of approach, saying that those accused gain an “unfair advantage by strict 
application of a limitations time bar.”56 Thus, the importance of victims having their day in court 
must then be weighed against the importance of defendants’ right of repose in order to determine 
whether or not statutes of limitation should toll until memory of the abuse occurs.57 Devices 
such as discovery rules will do just this.  These rules say that when there is delayed discovery of 
 
54 Spadaro, at 1164. 
55 Atkins, Lisa A., Comment, Remembered Memories… True or False?  Should the Discovery Rule be Applied to 
Toll the Statute of Limitations? 24 CAP. U.L. REV. 581, 584 (1995). 
56 Spadaro, at 1164. 
57.Atkins, at 594. 
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the cause of action, the statute of limitation does not run until the cause of action has been 
discovered.58 
b. Current Applications of Discovery Rules
In deciding whether to toll a statute of limitations in a repressed memory case by 
applying a delayed discovery rule, a court must weigh the interest of plaintiffs in having their 
day in court with the defendant’s interest in planning for the future without constant worry of 
liability.  Most civil cases involving repressed memories do not reach the appellate level.  Most 
state courts, however, find that the interest of the plaintiffs’, as well as the need to deter sexual 
abuse, outweigh the interests of defendants’, and as such, allow application of delayed discovery 
rules in cases involving repressed memories.59 In other words, courts liberally apply discovery 
rules to repressed memory cases because to do otherwise would leave victims without any 
recourse for awful crimes such as sexual abuse.60 
The discovery doctrine has received a wide range of interpretations.  Some states have 
actually rejected the doctrine entirely when applied to repressed memory cases.61 Narrower 
interpretations have required victims to show proof of the abuse in order to toll the applicable 
statute of limitations.62 Courts that take these narrow approaches in cases of repressed memory 
 
58 Id, at 585. 
59 Montoya, Jerald M., Comment, Requiring Clear and Convincing Proof in Tort Claims Involving Recently 
Recovered Repressed Memories, 25 SW. U. L. REV. 173 (1995). 
60 Atkins, at 587. 
61 Spadaro, at 1165. 
62 In Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226, 228 (Wash. 1986), the court held that a victim must show “objective, verifiable 
evidence of the original wrongful act and the resulting physical injury.   In Moriarty v. Garden Sanctuary Church of 
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seem to focus on the strength of the evidence when interpreting discovery rules.  These courts 
seem to look farther out towards the trial and assess the evidence that is likely to come in to 
support a claim of abuse before determining whether or not to allow the applicable discovery 
rule to toll the statute.  In other words, when it appears that the victim has solid evidence to 
prove his or her allegations courts seem more inclined to allow the discovery rule to toll the 
applicable statute of limitations.   
Since many courts will actually apply discovery rules in cases involving repressed 
memory, the issue typically becomes determining what constitutes “discovery,” so as to kick in a 
delayed discovery rule and toll the statute of limitations.   Victims argue for delayed discovery in 
a couple different ways.  For example, some argue that they repressed the memories of abuse 
from their conscious recall until after the expiration of the statute of limitations, while others 
argue that they did not make a connection between the abuse and their present problems until 
after the statute of limitations expired.63 
Unfortunately for plaintiffs, states that allow application of discovery rules apply a 
myriad of approaches rather than maintaining a consistent application of the doctrine.  As a 
result, even with clear discovery rules on the books, victims cannot know for sure whether or not 
they will receive their day in court.  Most broad interpretations of the discovery doctrine require 
varying degrees of knowledge on the part of victims. For example, some states require that 
victims show that they could not have made the causal connection between the abuse and the 
effects of the abuse even after “reasonable care and diligence.”64 Other states hold that the statute 
 
God, 334 S.C. 150, 173 (Ct. App. 1999), the court held that a victim must show “independently verifiable objective” 
evidence and “expert opinion testimony.”    
63 Eisenberg, at 255-256. 
64 Spadaro, at 1170. 
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of limitations will run as soon as the victim becomes aware of the abuse, irrespective of whether 
or not the victim has knowledge of the causal connection.65 And still others will toll the 
applicable statute of limitation until the victim has both knowledge of the abuse and knowledge 
of causation.66 
Discovery of the actual abuse means that the victim completely repressed the memory, 
while discovery of causation means that the victim had awareness of the abuse but just had not 
discovered the link between current psychological issues and the abuse until later.  As such, 
courts tend to prefer setting the “discovery” time to the time at which the victim discovers the 
actual abuse (complete repression) as opposed to the time at which the victim discovers the 
causal connection.67 Requiring knowledge of causation in addition to knowledge of the abuse 
itself makes it more likely that “discovery” will occur much later and thus toll the statute of 
limitation longer. 
V. RELIABILITY OF REPRESSED MEMORY
a. Standards Applied to Scientific and Quasi-Scientific Based Expert Testimony
Once a claim of sexual abuse survives the applicable statute of limitations, the victim 
must then deal with admissibility of recovered memory evidence into the courtroom.68 To make 
this determination, the reliability of recovered memory must be examined.  As this type of 
evidence will come into court through expert testimony, analysis of reliability begins by looking 
at the typical standards applied to expert testimony.  Unfortunately, evaluation of scientific 
expert testimony does not receive an abundance of guidance from case law, federal evidence 
 
65 Id, at 1169.   
66 Id, at 1170. 
67 Eisenberg, at 255. 
68 Spadaro, at 1170. 
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rules, or the various state evidentiary rules.  As of 1923, and up until 1975 when the Federal 
Rules of Evidence went into effect, courts followed the standard for evaluating scientific 
evidence as set forth in Frye v. United States.69 Under Frye, courts deem such evidence reliable 
if it has gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.70 
This general acceptance test began to lose some footing at the same time the Federal 
Rules of Evidence came into play,71 although, many states still apply the Frye standard.72 To 
summarize, the Federal Rules of Evidence require relevancy, which means that the evidence 
must tend to make the existence of an event or fact “more or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence.”73 In addition, even if relevant, the evidence cannot be unfairly prejudicial 
so as to substantially outweigh any probative value of the evidence.74 With regard to expert 
testimony, courts require reliability as well as relevancy.  Sufficient reliability exists if sufficient 
facts or data support the testimony and if reliable principles and methods were used and applied 
to specific facts of the case at hand.75 
Federal Rule of Evidence §702 did little, if anything, to clarify the standard for scientific 
evidence.76 Courts at the time had split views on whether to apply the general acceptance test of 
 
69 Bernstein, David E., Junk Science in the United States and the Commonwealth, Winter 1996 Yale Journal of 
International Law 123, 126-128. 
70 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
71 Id, at 1014.  Bernstein, Junk Science in the United States and the Commonwealth, at 128. 
72 Bernstein, Frye, Frye Again: The Past, Present, and Future of the General Acceptance Test, at 386. 
73 Federal Rules of Evidence §401. 
74 Federal Rules of Evidence §403. 
75 Federal Rules of Evidence §702. 
76 Bernstein, Junk Science in the United States and the Commonwealth, at 128. 
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Frye or the relevance based test set forth in §702.77 As a result of this split, various tests 
focusing on the reliability aspect of scientific evidence began to emerge.78 While these 
reliability tests took hold, courts began evaluating Frye again, reformulating it to address the 
reliability issue.79 At the same time, courts applying supposedly stricter reliability tests 
continued allowing in questionable testimony, leading to an increased battle over “junk 
science.”80 Critics of such evidence began pushing for a stricter version of Frye that would look 
behind the scenes at the methodology of the science testified to.81 Eventually, the Supreme 
Court answered their call, coming down with Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,82 
which put forth a multi-prong approach to the evaluation of the reliability of expert testimony.  
These prongs include whether or not the technique is generally accepted in the scientific 
community, the rate of error for the technique used, whether the theory is falsifiable, whether the 
theory has been subjected to peer review and publication, and whether standards exist to evaluate 
the technique.83 These factors are not definitive; courts can look at other factors as well.  
Essentially Daubert meant that the court must evaluate the trustworthiness of the expert and the 
 
77 Id, at 129. 
78 Id, at 129-132.   United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978) - Courts should weigh probativeness, 
materiality, and reliability against the possibility of prejudice to determine admissibility of scientific evidence; 
Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984) – An extremely liberal test favoring relevancy; 
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985) – Test focused on the expert’s reasoning.   
79 Id, at 132.   
80 Bernstein, Frye, Frye Again: The Past, Present, and Future of the General Acceptance Test, at 392. 
81 Id.
82 Daubert v. Verrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 509 U.S. 579, (1993). 
83 Id, at 593-594. 
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probativeness of the studies / data to the issues of the case.84 In other words, Daubert made the 
Frye standard only one of the multiple prongs to evaluate expert testimony by establishing new 
guidelines to replace the general acceptance test from Frye.85 
The development of Daubert also opened the door to a stricter evaluation of less 
scientific or quasi-scientific evidence; a category containing syndrome evidence such as 
repressed memories.86 Many Frye jurisdictions would not apply Frye’s general acceptance test 
to non-scientific evidence, however, once Daubert came along, quasi-scientific evidence could 
not necessarily escape stricter analysis anymore.  In fact it is rare that courts do not allow 
Daubert to apply to this less scientific or quasi-scientific evidence.87 Furthering the effect of 
Daubert on the evaluation of scientific evidence, the Supreme Court held in General Electric Co. 
v. Joiner88 that courts may analyze not only the general methodology of the science, but also the 
expert’s reasoning.89 In addition, the case of Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. V. Carmichael90 established 
that Daubert’s reliability test also applies to non-scientific evidence.91 
Despite all this tightening by Daubert and subsequent cases of the standard applied to 
expert testimony pertaining to both scientific and unscientific evidence, many states comprising 
 
84 Bernstein, Junk Science in the United States and the Commonwealth, at 136. 
85 Id, at 135. 
86 Id, at 137.  
87 Id, at 138. 
88 General Electric Co. v. Joiner , 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
89 Bernstein, Frye, Frye Again: The Past, Present, and Future of the General Acceptance Test, at 393.  
90 Kumho Tire Co., Ltd.  v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
91 Bernstein, Frye, Frye Again: The Past, Present, and Future of the General Acceptance Test, at 386.     
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almost half of the United States population still apply a Frye standard.92 Many states that have 
not adopted a Frye standard have also not adopted Daubert or the subsequent rule from Kumho 
Tire.93 Thus it remains unclear that Daubert and Kumho Tires actually apply in state court.94 
With most sexual abuse cases arising in state courts, this creates a less than clear idea as to the 
standard that should apply to repressed memory evidence.   
The split among Frye jurisdictions as to whether the general acceptance test should apply 
to the general methodologies or the conclusions of the expert further muddies the waters.95 
Instead of focusing on one or the other of these approaches, many Frye jurisdictions have instead 
chosen to focus on the reasoning behind the expert’s conclusions; a nod towards Joiner.96 
Evaluation of the expert’s reasoning leans toward applying Frye tests beyond just scientific 
evidence, but many Frye jurisdictions still claim that it does not apply to non-scientific evidence, 
such as testimony based on knowledge or experience, or social science evidence.  Syndrome 
evidence, however, largely remains the exception to the rule that Frye does not apply to social 
science evidence.97 Typically the rationale for not applying Frye to social science evidence 
stems from the belief that unlike other scientific evidence, social science evidence will not 
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93 Bernstein, Frye, Frye Again: The Past, Present, and Future of the General Acceptance Test, at 387-388.   
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necessarily appear infallible to jurors.98 The fact that syndrome evidence remains the exception 
to the rule seems to indicate an underlying assumption or belief that jurors will not necessarily 
assume fallibility of all social science evidence.      
b. Admissibility of Repressed Memory Evidence 
Unfortunately very little guidance by state courts exists regarding standards applied 
specifically to admissibility of repressed memory evidence in civil cases.  That is, states apply a 
variety of standards without any real consensus as to what the best standard should be.  Some 
courts apply a “per se excludable test”99 out of concern over suggestibility and reliability of 
repressed memory evidence.  Application of this test requires looking to the Frye standard. 100 
As previously discussed, this requires looking at only one of the prongs of Daubert; whether or 
not the theory has gained general acceptance in the scientific community.  Opponents who argue 
for a Daubert standard suggest that repressed memory fails multiple prongs of the test set forth in 
Daubert. They suggest that memory repression cannot be tested, and that without independent 
corroboration it can be easily falsified.  In addition, these opponents feel that the anecdotal 
information available on repressed memories has not been subject to peer review.  These 
opponents continue on to argue that regardless, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 would exclude 
such evidence due to its unfairly prejudicial nature.101 Such arguments under a Daubert 
approach fall short under a Frye-based approach because Frye does not require analyzing these 
things.  The “per se excludable test” also falls flat, however, because Daubert did overrule Frye 
98 Id.
99 Foster, E. A., Comment, Repressed Memory Syndrome: Preventing Invalid Sexual Abuse Cases in Illinois, 21 S. 
ILL. U. L. J. 169, 176 (Fall 1996). 
100 Id.   
101 Richmond, at 565. 
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and it is not clear which standard will apply to expert testimony.  As such, since the “per se 
excludable test” rests on application of a Frye standard, it rests on shaky ground.102 
Another approach allows all repressed memory into evidence.  This “total admissibility” 
approach allows the jury to evaluate and weigh the credibility of the recovered memory 
evidence.  Proponents of this approach argue that the jury will be able to properly asses the 
credibility via cross-examination. 103 This argument seems to show a belief by proponents of the 
“total admissibility” approach that recovered memory testimony is no different in terms of 
reliability than any other testimony. 
An alternative to both the “per se excludable” and “total admissibility” approaches 
includes assessing procedural safeguards followed during the recovery process as part of the 
evaluation of the totality of circumstances.104 Under this approach the court will focus on the 
procedure involved in obtaining the evidence before the trial begins to determine 
admissibility.105 Proponents of requiring certain procedural safeguards argue that these 
safeguards serve a dual purpose.  That is, they help bolster a victim’s claims of sexual abuse 
while minimizing the risk that defendants will have to face false charges.106 
Most of the procedures focus on hypnotically induced memory recovery, requiring a 
licensed therapist to conduct the hypnosis independent from any police or lawyers, with only the 
therapist and victim present.  The therapist must record the recollection of the victim both before 
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and during the hypnosis, preferably via videotape.107 Additional procedural safeguards might 
include recording the recollections without adding anything to the descriptions of the victim, 
having an impartial therapist conduct the session, limiting the amount of information the subject 
receives from the hypnotist, recording the session, and limiting the session to involving only the 
subject and the hypnotist.108 Other procedural safeguards take a stricter approach, requiring that 
the memory prior to hypnosis be the same as after hypnosis.  Proponents of this requirement 
argue that without it the memory recovered via hypnosis can be considered tainted.109 An 
additional stricter approach focuses on corroboration of the hypnotically recovered memory, 
requiring that the recovered memory must be corroborated independently from the hypnosis 
procedure.110 Corroboration occurs when a fact is presented that “confirms or supports the 
allegation.”111 Regardless of the specific procedural safeguards required, evaluating the totality 
of circumstances and requiring such safeguards represents a middle ground between the 
exclusion per se and total admissibility approaches.112 
This aforementioned variety of approaches exists for both forensically recovered 
memories and clinically recovered memories.  Forensically recovered memories are typically 
used in criminal prosecutions, while clinically recovered memories are used in the civil tort 
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context.113 Compared to forensically recovered memories, however, there is much less consensus 
from the courts as to which approach to use for clinically recovered memories.114 For 
forensically recovered memories, the United States Supreme Court suggests a middle ground 
totality of the circumstances standard for evaluation of such evidence.115 
Following suit from the approach typically used for forensically recovered memories, the 
United States Supreme Court does seem at least to advise against an approach that would 
exclude all clinically recovered memories per se.116 Some courts lean towards applying the 
middle ground approach involving evaluation of the totality of circumstances.117 Applying the 
aforementioned procedural safeguards becomes more difficult with clinically recovered 
memories as opposed to forensically recovered memories.  That is, many people recover memory 
or abuse during therapy irrespective of whether or not any type of litigation will later ensue.  
Thus requiring the recording of hypnosis sessions would prove infeasible a great deal of the time.  
As such, it has been suggested that instead of passing judgment on recovered memory testimony, 
such evidence will be admitted under the evidentiary rules pertaining to expert testimony in 
general.  The jury can then evaluate the reliability of the evidence under those standards.118 
c. Presentation of Repressed Memory Evidence
If repressed memory evidence meets whichever admissibility standard the court decides 
to apply, further restrictions exist regarding presentation of the evidence to the jury.  For 
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example, some courts hold that experts can testify as to their beliefs in the theory of memory 
repression and whether or not a victim’s behavior is “consistent with someone who suffers from 
repressed memories.”  These experts cannot, however, testify as to their opinion of whether or 
not the alleged abuse actually occurred.119 
In addition, courts might apply different standards of proof to recovered memory 
evidence.  Often a preponderance of the evidence standard applies to tort claims.120 This 
requires a showing that it is more likely than not that the abuse occurred.  Some courts, however, 
focus on procedural safeguards, namely corroboration, when deciding whether or not to allow 
the presentation of recovered memory testimony.  This corroboration requirement suggests 
showing clear and convincing evidence of the abuse, a higher standard of proof than 
preponderance of the evidence, requiring evidence that demonstrates a high probability of truth.  
Such corroborative evidence might include proof that a defendant has sexually abused others or 
physical proof of abuse to the current claimant. 121 
States might also require a higher standard of proof for cases that have involve “crime-
like torts” because these kinds of torts have a much more serious nature than most civil cases.122 
That is, sexual abuse claims produce serious consequences, including severe financial loss and 
damage to the reputation of accused defendants.  In addition, judgments against those accused of 
sexual abuse often result after the presentation of questionable and unsubstantiated evidence.  It 
 
119 Isely v. Capuchin Province, 877 F. Supp. 1055, 1067 (E.D. Mich. 1995). 
120 Montoya, at 197. 
121 Id, at 203. 
122 Id, at 198. 
27
has been suggested that sexual abuse claims fall into the category of “crime-like torts” and as 
such should require a heightened standard of proof.123 
VI. PROPOSALS FOR STATUTORY ADJUSTMENTS REGARDING TREATMENT OF 
REPRESSED MEMORY EVIDENCE
a. Introduction
States vary a great deal regarding their statutory approach to the issues discussed so far; 
many taking a far from adequate approach.  On one end of the spectrum sits a state such as New 
York, which does not have an extended statute of limitations for sexual abuse claims.  New York 
addresses statutes of limitations in §§214-215 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules.  
On the civil side, these two sections essentially distinguish between claims based on intentional 
torts and claims based in negligence, providing a one year statute of limitations for the former124 
and a three year statute of limitations for the latter125. In addition to this very basic approach the 
statute of limitations for claims based on intentional torts will only toll if the perpetrator has been 
charged with a crime126. Insanity or infancy can also occasionally toll the applicable statute of 
 
123 Id, at 199. 
124 New York Civil Practice Law and Rules §215: “The following actions shall be commenced within one year:...(3) 
an action to recover damages for assault, battery, false imprisonment…” 
125 New York Civil Practice Law and Rules §214: “The following actions must be commenced within three years: 
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126 New York Civil Practice Law and Rules §215(8): “Whenever it is shown that a criminal action against the same 
defendant has been commenced with respect to the event or occurrence from which a claim governed by this section 
arises, the plaintiff shall have at least one year from the termination of the criminal action as defined in section 1.20 
of the criminal procedure law in which to commence the civil action, notwithstanding that the time in which to 
commence such action has already expired or has less than a year remaining.” 
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limitations127. Other than these very limited examples128, New York does not, either statutorily 
or through case law, allow any other mechanisms to toll statutes of limitations.  This includes 
declining to apply discovery rules to sexual abuse cases involving repressed memory.    
On the other end of the spectrum sits a state such as California, which has a much more 
comprehensive and victim sensitive approach, as seen in California Civil Code of Procedure 
§340.1.  Sections (a) through (d) of this statute deal with the application of California’s statute of 
limitations.  Plaintiffs’ can sue for childhood sexual abuse up until the age of 26 or within three 
years of discovering the causal connection between the abuse and the injuries.129 The statute 
differentiates, however, between allegations against perpetrators and allegations against other 
entities.  If a plaintiff sues a defendant other than the alleged perpetrator under a negligence or 
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29
intentional tort theory, it must be established that the defendant “knew or had reason to know” of 
the abuse and failed to take reasonable precautionary measures to prevent it.130 If these two 
standards are not met, a plaintiff cannot sue non-perpetrator defendants past the age of 26.  In 
2003 the California state legislature actually opened up the statute for the entire year, allowing 
plaintiffs to bring claims otherwise limited by the three year discovery rule.131 
Section (f) of this statute goes on to discuss the applicable standards of proof once a 
claimant successfully survives the statute of limitation.  This section refers to §115 of the Code 
of Evidence,132 which states, “Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of proof requires 
proof by a preponderance of the evidence.”133 
b. Discovery Rules and Statutes of Limitations
States such as New York represent a prime example of society’s lax attitude towards 
helping victims of sexual abuse.  If state legislatures, such as that in New York, continue to 
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remain silent and ignorant to the issues involved in sexual abuse, society will never make 
progress in adequately addressing the needs of victims.  California, on the other hand, has 
demonstrated a much more open mind to the needs of victims.  Most states do not adequately 
address the backward-minded attitude society continues to have regarding sexual abuse.  As 
such, the aforementioned California statute represents a great model for other legislatures to 
follow when developing their own statutory schemes.   
 When developing a statutory scheme for treatment of sexual abuse lawsuits, legislatures 
should keep in mind the interests of both plaintiffs and defendants.  Plaintiffs have a strong 
interest in having their day in court, while defendants have an interest in preventing false claims 
of abuse.  Legislators must acknowledge the valid interests that defendants have in order to 
maintain credibility.  Distinguishing between therapeutically and spontaneously recovered 
memories accomplish this aim.  California’s statute does not make such a distinction, 
demonstrating that it is merely a starting point for other legislatures.   
 Instead of simply laying out time limits for when the clock should start ticking for statute 
of limitation purposes, statutes should include clear definitions of “discovery,” based on the 
method of memory recovery.  Limited definitions of “discovery” should apply to claimants who 
recover memory spontaneously.  These types of claimants have been unaware of the abuse 
through no fault of their own, and as such should not suffer more by getting locked out of court.  
Such a modification to California’s statute would include a provision stating, “For victims who 
recover memory of sexual abuse spontaneously, discovery occurs only after the claimant has a 
clear understanding that the abuse occurred, as well as a clear understanding of the causal 
connection between the abuse and psychological injuries.”  Requiring knowledge of both the 
abuse and causation will create a longer window of time for claimants to file suit.   
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This more limited definition of “discovery” should only apply in cases of sexual abuse.  
Opponents worry that allowing claimants who understand that the abuse occurred, but do not file 
suit in time because they do not make the causal connection, to extend the statute of limitations 
will render many statutes of limitations ineffective for a wide variety of other tortuous acts.  That 
is, opponents have concern that if an extended statute of limitations is allowed merely because a 
person’s “developmental limitations impaired or precluded their capacity to discover that an 
injury resulted from another person's tortuous act” such a standard would allow statutes of 
limitations to stay open regardless of whether the tort involved a negligent car accident or 
something much more serious.134 Limiting these definitions of “discovery” to cases involving 
sexual abuse acknowledges that extended statutes of limitations in some cases would create 
inequities for defendants, while also acknowledging the egregious nature of sexual abuse and 
that "the injustice of barring meritorious claims before the claimant knows of the injury 
outweighs the threat of stale or fraudulent actions.”135 
On the other hand, claimants who recover memory of abuse via therapeutic techniques 
should have to abide by a broader definition of “discovery.”  Such a provision might state, “For 
victims who recover memory of sexual abuse via therapeutic techniques, including but not 
limited to hypnosis and guided imagery, discovery occurs after the claimant has a clear 
understanding that the abuse occurred.”  Such a definition will clearly make the triggering of 
“discovery” easier for these types of claimants.  This distinction between methods of recovery 
serves to acknowledge the concerns related to false claims while still giving all claimants a fair 
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chance at having their day in court.  As long as state legislatures acknowledge valid concerns of 
defendants, they can succeed in applying delayed discovery rules in cases of sexual abuse 
because they will have greater credibility.   
Judges should only determine whether a claimant has discovered the abuse and or the 
causation required to trigger “discovery.”  Factors to evaluate in determining when the victim 
understood that abuse actually occurred should include the age of the victim, the number of years 
that have passed since the alleged abuse, and the time at which the victim first shared the abuse 
with anyone.  Factors to evaluate in determining when the victim understood the causal 
connection between the abuse and the psychological effects should include whether and when 
the victim sought therapy, as well as whether and when the victim told anyone else about any 
psychological effects.  In the case of a victim who never told anyone about the abuse and who 
never sought therapy, realization of the abuse and causal connection should be deemed to have 
occurred when the victim sought legal advice. 
Unlike Jorge L. Carro and Joseph V. Hatala who advocate an elimination of statutes of 
limitation for all cases of sexual abuse,136 an approach to application of discovery rules that 
distinguishes between types of recovery better balances the competing interests of victims and 
defendants.  Carro and Hatala suggest that complete elimination of all statutes of limitation 
would increase the quality of evidence presented at trials because victims would have more time 
to gather corroborative evidence.  They also suggest that it would decrease the number of 
unsubstantiated claims of sexual abuse because plaintiffs would not be racing the clock anymore.  
Their approach does nothing to alleviate concerns that opponents of recovered memory have 
because it does nothing to distinguish between how victims might recover their memories.  
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Sexual abuse cases will not often involve eye witnesses or other solid evidence, but will instead 
often rest on evidence such as recovered memories.  Carro and Hatala seem to suggest that 
eliminating the statute of limitations will allow plaintiffs more time to gather proof to 
substantiate and corroborate their claims.  However, a recovered memory is a recovered 
memory; it will not become more reliable just because the plaintiff has no time limit within 
which to file suit.  
Others have presented different victim-friendly approaches to application of discovery 
rules.  For example, Gregory Gordon suggests enacting legislation that focuses entirely on 
discovery of all the elements of abuse, rather than making distinctions between victims who 
remember or repress memories of abuse.137 Where this suggestion does certainly favor victims 
by saying that “discovery” only occurs after the victim has recovered memory of all the elements 
of the abuse, it allows for too much argument by opponents.  Gordon’s approach does not 
distinguish between methods of recovery.  Under his approach the statute of limitations would 
toll equally for victims who recovered memory of abuse through hypnosis and those who 
recovered memory of the abuse spontaneously.  As such, it takes into account none of the 
concerns regarding hypnotically induced memories of abuse. 
 Application based on the type of recovery method in play, on the other hand, creates a 
much better compromise of the competing interests because it makes an attempt to weed out less 
credible claims without making it impossible for victims to have their day in court.  As such, 
opponents of recovered memories lose some of their ammunition against this type of evidence.  
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In addition, such an approach adds greater predictability for claimants trying to determine 
whether or not they survived the applicable statute of limitations.  
c. Admissibility
Evaluating whether discovery has been triggered should mark the last role judges plays in 
sexual abuse cases.  That is, once past the statute of limitations hurdle, victims should have the 
freedom to present all recovered memory evidence to the jury.  Distinguishing between 
spontaneous and therapeutically recovered memories during the “discovery” phase has already 
served to weed out less credible claims of sexual abuse.  As such, victims should receive more of 
a break from an evidentiary perspective once they make it into the courtroom.  Codification of 
total admissibility will provide consistency for sexual abuse cases while also acknowledging that 
sexual abuse claims do not typically involve direct evidence of abuse.  These claims typically 
come down to a “he-said-she-said” situation.  If a victim has buried the memories of abuse, he or 
she will have no other way to fight the legal battle if he or she cannot testify to the repressed 
memories.    
 Admitting all recovered memory evidence will not result in inequities to defendants 
because the jury still has to evaluate this evidence according to applicable standards of proof.  In 
order to make progress in addressing the true horror of sexual abuse, courts and society must 
take some risk.  That is, society must have confidence in the jury system to catch any false 
claims.  Juries do not lack guidance when they evaluate evidence.  Cross-examinations 
conducted by defense attorneys help the jury evaluate the credibility of the victim as well as any 
testimony or evidence offered on behalf of the victim.   
d. Standard of Proof
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As stated previously, some have suggested that courts should adopt a higher standard of 
proof because of the “crime-like” nature of sexual abuse tort claims; particularly those involving 
recovered memories.138 This approach requires making a distinction based on the criminal 
nature of between various types of torts.  Unfortunately, such a distinction will create a fuzzy and 
unfair line because some torts may have both non-criminal and criminal similarities.  In addition, 
such an approach completely disregards the differentiation in facts that can exist from one 
repressed memory case to the next.  For instance, while one case might involve spontaneous 
memory recovery, another might involve therapy-induced memory recovery.  When a victim 
spontaneously recovers memory of abuse it seems unfair to inflict a harsher than normal standard 
of proof because arguably fewer reliability issues exist as compared to the victim who recovers 
memory via therapeutic techniques.  Thus, clumping all recovered memory cases into one 
category would not treat all claimants fairly.   
Instead, as previously mentioned in Section VI (b) of this paper, state legislatures should 
apply different standards of proof based on whether the claim involves spontaneous or 
therapeutically induced memory recovery.  Such an approach would serve to weed out less 
credible claims of sexual abuse while not denying claimants their day in court.  Distinctions 
based on the type of memory recovery involved at the beginning of the process with statutes of 
limitations and discovery rules, combined with the same approach at the end with standards of 
proof, nicely book-ends the more relaxed total admissibility standard.   
Such an approach in the standard of proof setting might include applying a higher 
standard to claimants who recover memories of abuse via therapeutic techniques while applying 
a regular preponderance of evidence standard to those who recover memories spontaneously.  
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This kind of split acknowledges that victims of sexual abuse will sometimes bury memories of 
abuse while also acknowledging that not all recovered memories have equal reliability.  
Claimants who recover memories of sexual abuse via therapeutic techniques should have to 
show independent corroboration.  Sufficient independent corroboration should include proof that 
the alleged perpetrator has abused others in the past or testimony from actual eye-witnesses to 
the abuse.  Other supplemental factors that should come in include journals kept by the victim 
before and after recovery of the memories of abuse, and extreme difficulty with gynecological or 
physical exams.  Obviously these two factors would not suffice alone to prove abuse, however, 
the jury should here all of it so as to adequately evaluate the totality of the situation.  Regardless 
of the standard of proof applied, cross-examination serves to assess credibility of all witnesses.  
Thus, a relatively low preponderance of evidence standard does not stand alone as a checkpoint 
on recovered memory evidence of the spontaneous nature.     
VII. CONCLUSION
Sexual abuse claims involve a myriad of controversial issues; repressed memory 
evidence certainly involving no less controversy than other issues.  In order to adequately 
address the needs of both victims and those accused of abuse, state legislatures need to step in 
and get more involved.  Legislatures should enact statutes that better deal with the lack of 
predictability and consistency that exists with current statutes of limitations, discovery rules, and 
standard of proof rules.  This paper does not suggest swaying all rules and statutes towards 
victims; rather it suggests designing legislation that adequately addresses the lack-luster attitude 
society continues to display towards this crime.   
Such legislation should acknowledge concerns opponents have so as to erode the footing of 
opponents of repressed memory.  One way to accomplish these goals involves distinguishing 
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cases based on the method of memory recovery, giving greater leeway to those who recovery 
memory spontaneously. 
 
